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Article 5

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION AFFECTING
RAILROAD EMPLOYEES
A.
LEGISLATION FOR RAILWAY EMPLOYEES UNDER THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE
The power of Congress to regulate interestate commerce
and incidentally, the relationship between railroads and
their employees, is derived from Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United States, which
reads as follows:
to regulate commerce with
"The Congress shall have the power
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."

A construction of the specifically delegated power to Congress to so regulate commerce among the states, by the Supreme Court of the United States, has definitely established
the principle that this grant of power to Congress is paramount over all legislative powers which, in consequence of
not having been granted to Congress, are reserved to the
states. A natural sequence of the above principle is that
any legislation of a state enacted in pursuance of any of its
reserved power, which conflicts with the actual exercise of
the power of Congress over the subject of Commerce, must
give way before the supremacy of thenatural authority, for
necessarily "that which is not supreme must yield to that
which is." 1
It has been established by constitutional authority that
transportation of property between the states is interstate
commerce and comes under the control of federal, rather
than state jurisdiction, although it has been said that interstate commerce in its practical conduct has many inci1 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 (1912)(Second
Employers' Liability Cases).
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dents having varying degrees of connection with it and
effect upon it over which the state may have some power.
This power of the state, which is gradually being absorbed
by the federal authority, has been divided into the following classes: (1) Those in which the power of the state
is exclusive; (2) Those in which the state may act in the
absence of legislation by Congress; (3)
Those in which
the action and power of Congress is exclusive and thereby
eliminating any power, real or imaginary, of state jurisdiction. These divisions, of course, are the extreme boundaries. The basis of the legislation and the facts supporting legislative action, especially that of state legislatures,
is, to a considerable extent, predominantly controlling where
there appears a conflict between federal and state jurisdiction in the absence of Congressional action on the legislative subject. Such legislation on the part of the state has
been declared valid where Congress has been silent on the
subject.2 An example frequently cited was the enactment
of laws by several states regulating the liability of railroads
engaged in interstate commerce for injuries received by their
employees while engaged in such commerce. The validity
of such legislation, however, was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States, because Congress, although empowered to regulate that subject, had not acted thereon,
and, also, because the subject was one which fell within the
police power of the states in the absence of action by Con2

Missouri P. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249 (1931).

The Court sus-

tained the Arkansas full crew law, on the ground that a purpose to prevent the
exertion of the police power of the states for the regulation of the number of
men to be employed in freight train and switching crews, will not be attributed
to Congress if not clearly expressed.
The mandate on affirmance was subsequently amended to read: "Affirmed
with costs without prejudice to any application to the District Court to amend
the pleadings or otherwise." Upon filing an amended bill and answer, the cause
was referred to a Master. A decision of a specially constituted District Court
of the United States for Arkansas on April 7, 1933, handed down an opinion
supported by finding of facts and conclusions of law that the complainant had
not produced sufficient evidence in attacking the constitutionality of the state law
and accordingly dismissed the bill, as amended, with costs.
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gress.' This does not mean that Congressional inaction in
no wise affects its power over the subject. As soon as Congress acts, the laws of the states affecting the same subject
and operating in the same field, are superseded.4 Under the
application of this rule, affirmed in Mondou v. New York, N.
H. & H. R. Co.5 (Second Employer's Liability Cases), and
repeatedly reaffirmed in analagous cases, 6 the more humane
state legislation enacted in behalf of its citizens who were
employees of interstate carriers was declared inoperative for
what appeared to be a more practical solution to an increasing problem. It is on the application of this same doctrine
that the various state workmen's compensation acts are held
to be inoperative and to exclude railroad employees where
their injuries have been sustained while they have been engaged within the regulatory provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, or where the carrier at the time of
the injury was guilty of violating one of the Safety Appliance
Acts, or any of the amendments thereto.
The present discussion deals solely with Federal Legislation which appears to be gradually wearing down the discrimination and legislative separation between employees
engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce. An impartial investigation of legislation concerning railroads and
their employees in recent years afford a basis of sufficient
legislative precedent repeatedly upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States, with one exception (the First
3 Chicago I. L. R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559 (1913), upheld an Indiana
statute under which relief was sought prior to the enactment of the Second
Employers' Liability Act.
4 Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912). Held, that the
Hours of Service Act, precluded the state from making or enforcing a local
regulation affecting hours of labor of railway employees even though the Federal
Act did not become effective until "one year after its passage." During that
year all state legislation was thus held to be inoperative and of no effect.
5 OP. cit. supra note 1.
6 Employers' Liability cases: Erie Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170 (1917);
St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702 (1913); New York C. R.
Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917); Pryor v. Williams, 254 U. S. 43 (1920).
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Federal Employer's Liability Act, 1906)' to warrant Federal legislation in behalf of that great body of men whose
activities are performed in support of an uninterrupted flow
of interstate commerce. Recognition by the Supreme Court
of the United States of this fact was never more clearly expressed than when construing the provisions of the Safety
Appliance Acts and amendments thereto.
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS

The initiative in providing remedial legislation in behalf
of their citizens who were employees of railroads operating
within and across their boundaries was left to the several
states which created railroad commissions for the effective
regulation of both forms of commerce. Such legislation
was enacted by several western states prior to the enactment
of the Interstate Commerce Act. With the increase in traffic necessarily causing an increase in the loss of life and
limb on railroads operating under safeguards provided by
state legislatures meeting infrequently, the legislation soon
proved ineffective. Conceding their inability to cope with
increased dangers the various state railroad commissioners,
at their first joint convention of 1889, adopted a resolution
urging Federal action. An investigation conducted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission warranted a report to
Congress in the same year disclosing the nature of accidents
to which employees were subjected primarily because of an
inadequate system of operating trains and cars with a great
variety of couplers, automatic or otherwise.
Approximately four years later (March 2, 1893) Congress
enacted an Act, entitled:
"An Act to Promote the Safety of Employees and Travelers upon
Railroads by Compelling Common Carriers Engaged in Interstate
Commerce to Equip Their Cars with Automatic Couplers and Con" Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co., 247 U. S. 463 (1908).
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tinuous Brakes and Their Locomotives with Driving-Wheel Brakes,
and for Other Purposes." 8

Section 1 of the Act declared it to be unlawful "for any
common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad
to use on its line any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic not equipped with a power driving-wheel
brake...
Section 2 declared it unlawful for any common carrier
similarly engaged to use or permit to be hauled any car
not equipped with automatic couplers dispensing with the
risk of men going between the ends of the cars.
The remaining sections, 3 to 7 inclusive of the original
act, applied to common carriers engaged according to the
provisions of the preceding sections
An amendment I to the Act, Section 8, was enacted in
1903, extending the provisions and requirements of the Act
to common carriers by railroad in the territories and the
District of Columbia, and were made to apply "in all cases,
whether or not the couplers brought together are of the
same kind, make, or type" and that the provisions and requirements relating to train brakes, automatic couplers, grab
irons, and the height of draw bars, were made to apply to
"all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars and similar vehicles,
used in any railroad engaged in interstate commerce." At
the same time Sections 9 and 10 were added.
Several additional amendments,"° Section 11 to 16 inclusive, were enacted April 14, 1910, by Congress and sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States." Here
for the first time was created a precedent which was to guide
Congress in the future in enacting legislation of still more
8 27 Stat. 531, C. 196, April 1, 1896, 29 Stat. 85, C. 87, U. S. C., title 45,
§§ 1-7.
9 32 Stat. 943, C. 976, U. S. C., title 45, §§ 8-10.
10 36 Stat. 298, C. 160, U. S. C., title 45, §§ 11-16.
11 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Williams, 242 U. S.462 (1917).
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benefit to railroad employees regardless of their employment
capacity. The most recent legislation of this type is the
Railway Labor Act 12 of May 20, 1926, discussed hereinafter.
The constitutionality of the Safety Appliance Act had
been sustained by two lower Federal Courts prior to its
consideration on constitutional grounds by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Wabash R. Co. v. United
R. Co. 14
States13 and United States v. International& G. N.
It was definitely held in 1911, in Southern R. Co. v. United
States, 5 that Congress had the power, not only under the
commerce clause of the Constitution, but because its power
to regulate commerce is plenary, and competently may be
exercised, as is conferred upon the states under their police
powers, to secure the safety of the persons and property
transported therein and of those who are employed in such
transportation "no matter what may be the source of the
dangers which threaten it." 1 6 To further quote from the
opinion by Mr. Justice Van Devanter: "That is to say, it
is no objection to such an exertion of this power that the
dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part,
out of matters connected with intrastate commerce." IT The
question whether the Acts were within the power of Congress to enact under the commerce clause, considering that
they were not confined to vehicles engaged in interstate
traffic, was stated by the court in another way: "Is there
such a close or direct relation or connection between the
two classes of traffic, when moving over the same railroad,
as to make it certain that the safety of the interstate traffic
and of those who are employed in its movement will be
promoted in a real or substantial sense by applying the
12
13
14
15

44 Stat. 577, C. 347, U. S. C., title45, §§ 151-163.
168 Fed. 1 (1909).
174 Fed. 638 (1909).
222 U. S. 20 (1911).

16

Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 27 (1911).
Op. cit. supra note 16.

1T
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requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the
traffic which is intrastate as well as to those used in moving that which is interstate?" I'sThe answer was in the
affirmative. But the announcement of the real benefit to
be derived by the employees from this legislation was reserved until the concluding part of the opinion where the
court said:
"Speaking only of railroads which are highways of both interstate
and intrastate commerce, these things are of common knowledge: Both
classes of traffic are at times carried in the same car, and when this
is not the case, the cars in which they are carried are frequently commingled in the same train and in the switching and other movements
at terminals. Cars are seldom set apart for exclusive use in moving
either class of traffic, but generally are used interchangeably in moving both; and the situation is much the same with trainmen, switchmen, and like employees, for they usually, if not necessarily, have to
do with both classes of traffic. Besides, the several trains on the
same railroad are not independent in point of movement and safety,
but are interdependent; for whatever brings delay or disaster to one,
or results in disabling one of its operatives, is calculated to impede
the progress and imperil the safety of other trains. And so the absence of appropriate safety appliances from any part of any train is
a menace not only to that train, but to others." 19

On April 14, 1910, Congress added six amendatory sections to the original act, as amended.20 The amendatory Act
of 1910 grew out of the defective and continually increasing
dangerous condition in which appliances, such as sill steps,
ladders, running boards, and hand-brakes were frequently
allowed to remain, although repeatedly called to the attention of the operating carriers; the utter failure to uniformly
effect improved conditions and the fact that the original act
precluded lawful movement of a car with defective equipment to a repair point.
The court, therefore, held that added strength to the
original act was given by Section 8, and so enlarged the
scope of the original act so as to embrace all cars used on
18 Southern R. Co. v. United States, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 26.
19 Southern R. Co. v. United States, op. cit. suPra note 19, at p. 27.
20 See note 9, supra.
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any railway operating as a highway of interstate commerce,
whether the cars employed at the time were engaged in interstate or intrastatecommerce. The effect of including, as
a result of the amendatory act of 1903, intrastateemployees
was disclosed in an opinion several years later in Texas &
P. R. Co. v. Rigsby,2 where it was earnestly insisted that
the plaintiff, Rigsby, a switchman, "was not under the protection of the Safety Appliance Acts because, at the time
he was injured he was not engaged in interstate commerce."
The employee's injury was directly attributable to the carrier's violation of one of the provisions of the amendments of
1910. In deciding that the employee, although not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury was
within the provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts, the court
was not content to rest its decision upon the narrow ground,
although supported by numerous decisions, that the doing
of the employee's work, and his security while doing it, could
not be said to have been wholly unrelated to the safety of
the main track as a highway of interstate commerce. The
reason for the court's unwillingness to so base its decision
and to so stigmatize the law, was because, said the court,
"we are convinced that there is no constitutional obstacle
in the way of giving to the act in its remedial aspect as
broad an application as was accorded to its penal provisions
in Southern R. Co. v. United States." 22 After discussing
the paramount power of federal legislation over that enacted
by the states, the court held that the consequences following a breach of the federal law "were vital and integral to
its effect as a regulation of conduct, liability to private suit
is or may be as potent a deterrent as liability to public prosecution, and in this respect there is no distinction dependent
upon whether the suitor was injured while employed or
traveling in one kind of commerce rather than the other." 23
21
22
23

241 U. S. 33 (1915).
222 U. S. 20 (1911).
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Rigsby, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 42.
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Having reiterated the supreme power of Congress over state
legislation on the same subject, and conceding that while
the mere question of compensation to persons injured in intrastate commerce is of no concern to Congress, the fact
nevertheless remained, according to the court, that the liability of carriers engaged in interstate commerce to pay
compensation as provided because of the violation of established regulations for safeguarding interstate commerce
was a matter "within the control of Congress." 24
Seldom has the cry of discrimination been heard from the
employees of railroads whose duties are confined more or
less to intrastate commerce activities, in protest to enactment of legislation affecting their interests. This has been
due in part, because it had previously been conceded, after
the opinion in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, that
only those employees engaged in interstate commerce, with
certain exceptions, of which the Safety Appliance Acts provisions were one, were within the regulatory power of Congress. That such a protest would be justified is obvious from
the concluding language of the above opinion, where the
court said:
"Unless persons injured in intrastatecommerce are to be excluded
from the benefit of a remedial action that is provided for persons
similarly injured in interstate commerce,--a discrimination certainly
not required by anything in the Constitution-remedialactions in be-

half of intrastate employees and travelers must either be governed by
the acts of Congress or else be left subject to regulation by the several
states, with probable differences in the law material to its effect as
regulatory of the conduct of the carrier." 25
By subsequent interpretations and constructions of the
original Acts, and amendments thereto, the laws so written
were by no means confined in their terms to the protection
of employees engaged to go between cars to couple and unOp. cit. supra note 23.
Op. cit. supra note 23. See also Illinois C. R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S.
473, 477 (1914). The view of the court was expressed by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who delivered the opinion in the Second Employers' Liability cases, supra.
24
25
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couple them. They applied equally to those employees injured when not so engaged. The opinions of the Supreme
Court make it clear that the liability of the carriers for
damages to their employees for failure to comply with the
terms of the Acts, as amended, springs from the declaration
of it being unlawful to use cars equipped otherwise than as
provided, and, as was held in Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Layton,2" "not from the position the employee may be in,
or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he
is injured."

THE

HOURS OF SERVICE ACT

On March 4, 1907, at the instigation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 27 and also upon recommendation
of President Roosevelt, 28 Congress enacted an Act entitled
"An Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers
upon railroads by limiting the hours of service of employees
thereon," otherwise referred to as the Hours of Service Act.2"
This Act is applicable to all employees connected with the
movement of trains in interstate transportation, including
those who are, by virtue of practical necessity, also employed in intrastate transportation, but intrastate railroads
and employees wholly engaged in local business are not
affected by its provisions.
The Act, prior to the amendments enacted May 4, 1916,
Sections 3 and 4, and Amendment to Section 2 of the original
Act, received judicial approval in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
InterstateCom. Com. ° The carrier had unsuccessfully contended that the Act in its scope was the same as the First
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1906. This contention,
however, was overruled by Mr. Justice Hughes in deciding
26

243 U. S. 617, 621 (1916).

27
28

1904 Ann. Rep. 78, 79; 1905 Ann. Rep. 105.
Message of December 4, 1906.

29

34 Stat. 1415, C. 2939, § 3, U. S. C., title 45, § 63.

Liability extends

to officers and agents and is thus distinguished from the Safety Appliance Acts.
See: Sherman v. United States, 282 U. S. 25 (1930).
30

221 U. S. 612 (1910).
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that the Act was constitutional. This argument made by
the carrier, Mr. Justice Hughes, said:
".. . undoubtedly involves the consideration that the interstate and
intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so interwoven that it is
utterly impracticable for them to divide their employes in such manner that the duties of those who are engaged in connection with
interstate commerce shall be confined to that commerce exclusively.
And thus, many employes who have to do with the movement of
trains in interstate transportation are, by virtue of practical necessity, also employed in intrastate transportafion."

The Court's answer appears as follows:
"This consideration, however, lends no support to the contention that
the statute is invalid. For there cannot be denied to Congress the
effective exercise of its constitutional authority. By virtue of its
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, Congress may
enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and property that are
transported in that commerce, and of those who are employed in
transporting them. . . The fundamental question here is whether a
restriction upon the hours of labor of employes who are connected
with the movement of trains in interstate transportation is comprehended within this sphere of authorized legislation. This question
admits of but one answer. The length of hours of service has direct
relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection
to life and property necessarily depends. This has been repeatedly
emphasized in official reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is a matter so plain as to 'require no elaboration. In its
power suitably to provide for the safety of employes and travelers,
Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances, but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor
to reduce, the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of
duty on the part of engineers, conductors, train dispatchers, telegraphers, and other persons embraced within the class defined by the
act."

The Court having declared that Congress can limit the
hours of labor of employees of carriers engaged in interstate
transportation, as provided in the act, it likewise gave support to the power by holding that it could not be defeated
either by prolonging the period of service through other
requirements of the carriers, or by the commingling of duties
relating to interstate and intrastate operations.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
THE ADAMSON EIGHT HOUR ACT

This Act "' resulted from an imminent interruption of interstate commerce by a threatened general strike of railway employees. President Wilson pointed out that no resources at law were at his disposal for compulsory arbitration in order to compose the differences between the carriers
and the employees and asked Congress to fix the eight hour
standard of work and wages and for the creation of an official body to observe the operation of the legislation. Congress responded by enacting the law which was approved,
first, on September 3, 1916, and, as that day was Sunday
and the following Monday was Labor Day, again on September 5, 1916. The Act fixed eight hours as a day's work,
and provided that for some months, pending an investigation, the compensation of employees of railroads subject
to the Act to Regulate Commerce should not be "reduced
below the present standard day's wage," and that time in
excess of eight hours should be paid pro rata at the same
rate. The first Section of the Act provided that "Eight
hours shall, in contracts for labor and service, be deemed a
day's work and the measure or standard of a day's work for
the purpose of reckoning the compensation for services of
all employees who are now or may hereafter be employed
by any common carrier by railroad. . ." engaged in interstate commerce, and excepted certain roads not exceeding
one hundred miles in length, electric street railroads, etc.
The Act was sustained by the Supreme Court in Wilson v.
New, 2 in an opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice White.
The question as to the power of Congress to so legislate
even though intrastate employees may be affected was not
raised as in the previous cases involving the constitutionality
of the Safety Appliance Acts, the First Federal Employers'
Liability Act, or the Hours of Service Act. It is apparent
31

32

39 Stat. 721, C. 436.
243 U. S. 332 (1916).
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that the carriers recognized from the language contained in
the Act that it covered all employees of carriers subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act. There existed up to this time
clear-cut precedents for the action of Congress and for including those employees of interstate carriers whose duties
were solely of intrastate operation, as to concede the point.
The question invariably raised in the attacks made on other
remedial legislation is therefore made conspicuous by its
absence. In sustaining the Act, Mr. Chief Justice White,
in the majority opinion, relied upon the former precedents
sustaining similar legislation affecting regulation of carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and their employees.
In the course of this opinion, he said:
"Certain is it that the power (to regulate) has been exercised so as
to deal not only with the carrier, but with its servants, and to regulate
the relation of such servants not only with their employers, but between themselves. [Reference is made to cases cited in a note.] Illustrations of the latter are afforded by the Hours of Service Act, the
Safety Appliance Act, and the Employers' Liability Act." 3

We would be providing for a lame and impotent conclusion
were we not to point out here that the cost of regulation
ultimately incurred by the instruments so regulated is not
a necessary factor to be considered by the court in an attack made on the laws involved. "Clear," said the Court,
"also is it that an obligation rests upon a carrier to carry
on its business and that conditions of cost or other obstacles
afford no excuse and exempt from no responsibility which
arises from a failure to do so, and also that government
possesses the full regulatory power to compel performance
of such duty." "
THE BOILER INSPECTION ACT

The Ash Pan Act3 5 of May 30, 1908, and Locomotive Inspection Act 36 of February 17, 1911, otherwise known as
33
34

35
36

Wilson v. New, op. cit. supra note 32, at pp. 349-50.
Wilson v. New, op. cit. supra note 32, at p. 350.
35 Stat. 476, C. 225.
36 Stat. 913, C. 103, 43 Stat. 659, C. 355 (1924).
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the Boiler Inspection Act, were similarly sustained on the
ground that they were within the congressional power to
regulate commerce. These acts were enacted for the safety
of the employees as verified in the opinions of Great Northern
R. Co. v. Donaldson17 and Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Groe38
ger
In 1915, the latter act was extended to cover the locomotive, its tender, and their appurtenances and created in
the Interstate Commerce Commission the right and duty of
inspection. The Act was otherwise made complete when in
June, 1924, it was extended to all locomotives, electric as
well as steam.
In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,"0 the Boiler Inspection Act was "conceded to apply to a locomotive used
on a highway of interstate commerce, even if it is operated
wholly within one state and is not engaged in hauling interstate, freight or passengers."
The Federal Safety Appliance and Locomotive Inspection
Acts having been declared to have been adopted for the
health and safety of employees 40 whether engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce indicates, on the part of Congress, a desire to make more uniform the regulation between
carriers and their employees with respect to liability for
injuries and to compensate to some extent at least for the
discrimination effected in the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, and its subsequent amendment in 1910.

37
38
39

246 U. S. 121 (1917).
266 U. S. 521 (1924).
272 U. S. 605, 607 (1926).

40 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Donaldson, op. cit. supra note 37; Balt. &
0. R. Co. v. Groeger, op. cit. supra note 38.
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B.
LEGISLATION FOR ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN
CARRIERS AND

THEIR

EMPLOYEES

THE ARBITRATION ACT OF 1888

This Act 41 provided for voluntary and compulsory investigation. It existed for ten years and during that time its
provisions were not once called into use.
THE ERDMAN ACT'OF 1898

This Act 42 provided for meliation and arbitration. Until
1906, the Act was called into operation only once. However, from that date until the enactment of the Newlands
Act, in 1913, it was frequently applied in railroad labor disputes.
THE NEWLANDS ACT OF 1913
This Act 43 was materially different from the previous
acts in that it set up a permanent, full time Board of Arbitration and Conciliation. During the trial period which was
short lived the Act proved successful, as far as the public
was concerned, and then abruptly failed at a time when most
needed. A nation-wide strike on the railroads of the coun-

try was averted by the timely Act of Congress, granting
the employees' demands. The above Acts controlled the
carriers and all employees of such carriers as were engaged

in interstate commerce. Under the latter Act, the term employees included "all persons actually engaged in any capacity in train operation or train service of any description..."
Here was the broadest and all inclusive provision ever enacted by Congress controlling carriers and their employees
in any particular.
41

42
43

25 Stat. 501, C. 1063.
30 Stat. 424, C. 370.
38 Stat. 103, C. 6.
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THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF

1920

The Railroad Labor Board
Shortly after the United States became involved in the
War, 'the President took over the railroads of the country.
The relations of the carriers and their employees was thereupon completely changed. Executive orders were issued
providing for the settlement of disputes through bipartisan
adjustment boards. The liberal display of patriotism on
the part of the employees is shown by the fact that during
the period of governmental operation no strikes occurred.
With the return of the railroads to private ownership,
March 1, 1920, and the termination of Federal control, there
immediately arose numerous differences in Congress as to
methods of providing for the settlement of disputes between
carriers and their employees. As a final result of the efforts
of Congress, the Railroad Labor Board was created by the
Transportation Act.44 Nine members were provided for to
be appointed by the President. The carriers and their employees were represented by three each, the remaining three
members (neutral) were appointed to represent the public.
Vigorous opposition was made by the employees' bona
fide organizations to the enactment of this legislation.
Unlike the Newlands Act, the Transportation Act did not
include a definition of employees. It, however, imposed a
duty on all carriers subject to the Act and their officers
"employees, and agents to exert every reasonable effort and
adopt every available means to avoid any interruption to
the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees or subordinate officials
thereof."
The unpopularity of the decisions of the Board continued
to grow from the start and finally terminated in the strike
of 1922. The Shop-Crafts refused to accept the board's de44

Title III. of the Transportation Act of 1920; 41 Stat. 456, 469, C. 91.
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cision over working rules. In September of the same year
an injunction was issued in the United States District Court,
at Chicago, causing the strike to end in failure.45
Although the Board, because of its injudicious decisions
became discredited shortly after its creation, it became more
so after the strike. The employees of railroads throughout
the United States immediately began a campaign for the
abolition of the Board and recommended the enactment
of a new measure. The carriers, sensing the support of
public opinion behind the employees' demands, changed their
stubborn campaign of opposition, which was actively supported by the public representative office holders on the
Board, and joined the employees in conferences to prepare
the submission of a new measure to Congress. Out of these
conferences resulted the Howell-Barkley Bill and finally

the Watson-Parker Act, otherwise known as the Railway
Labor Act.
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT

Act, 4"

This
approved May 20, 1926, followed certain introductory provisions of the Newlands Act, most important
45 United States v. Railroad E. Dept. A. F. of L., 283 Fed. 479 (1922), 290
Fed. 978 (1923).
46 44 Stat. 577, C. 347, U. S. C., title 45, §§ 151-163.
On March 3, 1933, Congress passed, and the President approved of An
Act "To amend an Act entitled 'An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States.'" (H. R. 14359).
Under Sec. 77, on Reorganization of Railroads, sub-divs.:
(0)
The right of railway employees under contract are preserved. No changes
of wages or working conditions are permissible by a "judge or trustee" except
in the manner prescribed in the Railway Labor Act.
(p) The right of an employee to join a labor organization of his choice
shall not be denied; no company unions shall be maintained by any "judge or
trustee" out of "funds of the railroad under his jurisdiction."
(q) Abolishes "yellow-dog contracts"; provides for blanket cancellation of
contract if in existence at the time jurisdiction attaches though enforced prior
thereto.
This provision gives further emphasis to the rights of employees of interstate
carriers and it is hoped will discourage frequent cuts in pay and abolition of
rules without notice to or conference with the duly authorized representatives
of the employees. Much of the credit for sponsoring this amendment to the Bankruptcy Act is due to Senator George W. Norris, who introduced the amendment
on the floor of the Senate. See Vol. 76, Cong. Rec., pp. 5260, 6265. (Feb. 27,
1933.)
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of which was the definition of employees. The term "employees," as defined in Section 1, Fifth, of the Railway Labor
Act, includes "every person in the service of a carrier (subject to its continuing authority to supervise and direct the
manner of rendition of his service) who performs any work
defined as that of an employee or subordinate official, in the
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, now in
effect. .. "
It has long since been accepted by the carriers in general,
and in no case, involving the Act or a construction of any
of its provisions, has any question been raised as to the
power of Congress to include employees whose work and
labor is not anywhere near the character of that strictly required for employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. An example of the far-reaching and all inclusive provision of the section governing and defining employees is noted in the comparatively recent case of the
Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks
(Southern Pacific Clerks' Case)." The plaintiff Brotherhood was organized in September, 1918, and had been authorized by a majority of the railway clerks in the employ
of the railroad company (apart from general office employees) to represent them in all matters relating to their
clerical employment. The railroad company sought to intimidate members of the Brotherhood and to coerce them
to withdraw from it and to sign up with the company union
association. A temporary injunction was granted by the lower
federal court and for failure to abide by its terms, proceedings for contempt were instituted against certain officers of
the railroad company. Certain provisions were imposed on
the defendants in order to purge themselves of the contempt
and punishment was prescribed in case they failed to abide
by the order of the court. On final hearing, the temporary
47

281 U. S. 548 (1930).
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injunction was made permanent. 8 The decree was later
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals 49 and the Supreme
The Act was held to be conCourt of the United States.8
stitutional. From the language of the opinion it is safe to
assume that had the question of the power of Congress to
include all employees as defined in the Act within the terms
of the Act, the Court would still have held that Congress
under the power tW regulate commerce rightly exercised its
plenary power here to enact "all appropriate legislation" for
its "protection and advancement," 51 and "to promote its
growth and insure its safety." 52
C.
PENDING LEGISLATION

Six-Hour Day
On July 14, 1932, a bill was introduced by Senator Wagner, S-4980, to establish the six-hour day as the standard
work day on steam railroads. The succeeding day a companion bill was introduced in the House (H. R. 12991).11
Previously a resolution was introduced in Congress, directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate
what would be the effect upon operation, etc., of applying
the six-hour day "in the employment of all classes and
each particular class of railway employees because of such
48 Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, etc., v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., 25
Fed. (2d) 873 (1928).
49 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 33

Fed. (2d) 13 (1929).

50 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S.
548 (1930).
51 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564 (1871).
52 County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697 (1881).
53 Act of March 15, 1932, 47 Stat., C. 78.
The Interstate Commerce Commission presented its Report, Ex Parte 106,
on December 6, 1932. Assuming that the present wage reduction is continued,
the initial effect of enforcing the six-hour day would be an increase of approximately $630,000,000 per year in operating expenses while at the same time it
would render necessary between 300,000 and 350,000 additional carrier employees
in a year such as 1930, and between 60,000 and 100,000 additional employees in
a year of abnormal economic conditions as presently exists. See note 33, supra.
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application." Subsequently the Railway Labor Executives
Association petitioned the Commission to order an extension of its investigation to include express companies and
sleeping car companies. Such an order was finally entered
by the Commission on May 19, 1932.
The provision of the Bills introduced made careful provision for the inclusion of all employees by adopting the
same terms as were used in the Adamson Eight-Hour Law.
Retirement Insurance-Pension
Senator Robert F. Wagner, introduced on March 2, 1932,
a bill (S. 3892) to provide for retirement insurance of railway employees. 4 The term employee includes every person in the service of a carrier who is included in the definition of "employee" in the Railway Labor Act.
Interstate Workmen's Compensation Act
On April 11, 1933, Senator Wagner, introduced a bill
(S. 1320) to provide compensation for disability or death
resulting from injury to employees in interstate commerce,
and for other purposes. The purpose of the legislation is
to extend the principle of workmen's compensation for industrial accidents to "the most important group of workers
remaining without this modern protection,-interstate commerce employees."
54
A similar bill was introduced by Senator Hatfield (S. 4646). Hearings
on these bills were concluded January 19, 1933. On March 27, 1933, Senator
Hatfield introduced S. 817, to provide for a retirement system of railroad and
transportation employees, to provide unemployment relief and for other purposes. Cong. Rec., Vol. 77, p. 843.
55 Cong. Rec., p. 14191. On June 23, 1932, a similar bill (S. 4927) was
introduced by Senator Wagner. Cong. Rec., p. 14191. On February 25, 1933,
an amended bill was introduced by Senator Wagner (S. 5695). Many improvements were contained in the latter bill over the provisions of the earlier. Relief,
however, including the latest bill (S. 1320), is still restricted, and compensation
under Section 3 of the Act is payable "only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring when the employee is employed in interstate or foreign
commerce.. ."

LEGISLATION AFFECTING RAILROAD EMPLOYEES 449

The proposed Act provides that the United States Employees' Compensation Commission shall administer the provisions of the Act. The bill itself follows closely the welltested Federal Longshoremen's Act of 192 7."
Provisions of the Act cover only those employees where
the disability or death results from an injury occurring
when the employee is employed in interstate or foreign commerce.
The above restriction is practically the same as is now
imposed by the terms of the present Federal Employers'
Liability Act."
While the proposed legislation has many
admirable provisions there appears to this writer no just
reason why all employees of interstate carriers, as in the
provisions of the preceeding Acts should not be included.
The loss occasioned is the same to the employer-carrier in
the case of an accident to an employee whose duties are
continually being changed from that of interstate to intrastate commerce. His position in order to avoid an interruption in whatever commerce he might have been engaged
at the time of his injury must be refilled. With the additional increase of burdens cast upon a railway employee today, due to retrenchments and lay-offs, there exists scarcely
an employee engaged in train operation who at some time
or other during his daily routine is not engaged in assisting
in an uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce. The discrimination in the proposed bill, as was said in the Rigsby
case, is "certainly not required by anything in the Constitu-

tion."

58

D.
CONCLUSION

It is devoutly to be hoped that all railway employees will
participate in the "New Deal" and that legislation now pend56 44 Stat. 1424, C. 509, U. S. C., title 33, §§ 901-950.
57

Act of April 22, 1908, U. S. C., title 45, §§ 51-59.

58

Op. cit. supra note 21.
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ing in Congress will protect to the full the interests of all
employees of interstate carriers. With the pending plans submitted to the President and his advisers for railroad consolidation, the interests of the numerous employees cannot be
overlooked. That Congress has the power to legislate for
the protection of the interests of all employees of interstate
carriers is not to be doubted in view of the strong language
used in the opinion of the Southern Pacific Clerks' Case.
Thus was opened up a new era for that great body of men
who are still laboring under certain antedeluvian remedial
acts, which the pending legislation gives every promise to
repeal.
Leo J. Hassenauer.
Chicago, Illinois.

